Dr. Archana Negi, who recently made a presentation about the climate change negotiations and Copenhagen, at the CIPOD Wednesday seminar series, has written up her presentation. The essay, "Countdown to Copenhagen: State of Play of the Climate Change Negotiations," is to be published by Think India. You can read the early copy here . . .
‘Countdown to Copenhagen’: State of Play of
Climate Change Negotiations
Archna Negi
On the official website of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), a ticking clock marks time to the second accompanied with the words ‘Countdown to Copenhagen’. The ticking seconds convey a sense of urgency; viewed positively, they seem to suggest that as the clock stops ticking, the world will find its solution to the problem of climate change (at Copenhagen); viewed in a more pessimistic light, the clock conveys that we have only so much time left to find a solution to global warming (at Copenhagen) and that time is running out. Whatever it is that the clock is meant to convey, it is a foregone conclusion now that the clock will have to be reset.
At the 13th Conference of Parties (COP 13) of the UNFCCC held at Bali in 2007, consensus had been forged to reach an ‘agreed outcome’ by the 15th Conference of Parties (COP 15), scheduled to be held at Copenhagen, Denmark between the 7th and 18th of December this year. Representatives of over 170 governments will converge in the Danish city of Copenhagen, carrying on their shoulders the weight of the world’s expectations that they will come out with the magic solution to the single most pervasive problem of a planetary scale – climate change. They will be closely and keenly watched by thousands of representatives of the nongovernmental sector and the media present at the event, and through transmission and reporting, by the world at large. Copenhagen, after all, was the chosen birthplace of the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, the current legal device to address climate change, which will reach the end of its life in the year 2012.
It is worthwhile to recall briefly the journey till this point in time where the second phase of legal protections against climate change is being worked out. Recognition of the need for international cooperation and global action on the issue of climate change was first embodied in the UNFCCC, adopted at the mother of all summits – the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. The Framework Convention established for itself the twin goals of stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere to a safe level (mitigation) and coping with temperature rise (adaptation).
Although the gentle provisions of the mother convention (UNFCCC) proved to be widely acceptable and led to a near universal membership, which currently stands at 192, the notorious child (Kyoto Protocol) proved to be far more controversial. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 contained specific obligations to be undertaken by parties, including binding emission reduction targets that were imposed on some (Annex I) parties. Of the 184 parties to the Protocol, 37 industrialized states and the European Communities committed to reduce GHG emissions [by an average of 5% against 1990 levels over the 5-year period (2008-2012)]. The defining feature of the Kyoto Protocol (also what makes it most controversial) is that it is based on the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, i.e. it recognizes that the developed countries are principally responsible for current GHG stock in the atmosphere (emitted in 150-200 years of industrial activity) and therefore places a higher burden on them. While industrial countries are to meet their reduction targets first and foremost by taking domestic action, the Protocol allows the meeting of emission reduction commitments abroad through market based ‘Kyoto mechanisms’.
The Kyoto mechanisms – Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism – allow for flexibility in meeting emission reduction commitments if they cannot be met purely by domestic action. As part of the ‘carbon market’ set up under the Emissions Trading mechanism (Article 17), parties with emission reduction commitments are assigned targets for the 2008-2012 commitment period and if countries have spare emission units, they can sell their excess units to other committed countries that are likely to cross their target. A country with emission reduction targets may earn emission reduction units by implementing emission-reduction projects in other countries – it can do so in another Annex I country [Joint Implementation (Article 6)] or in a developing country [Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12)].
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol was not smooth because the emission reductions that it mandated were viewed as a curtailment of development activities. The biggest carbon emitter remained notably absent from the Kyoto regime, refusing to be bound by the commitments imposed by the Protocol. The US administration made it clear that it would not be signatory to any protocol that (i) did not include binding targets and timetables for developing countries as well or (ii) that would result in ‘serious harm’ to the American economy. Despite the non-participation of the largest emitter, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005 when Russia ratified it, fulfilling the legal requirements for entry into force. While Australia – the other major long-time non-member – came on board in December 2007 (ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was the first official act of the new Kevin Rudd government), the US continues to remain outside the sphere of operation of the Protocol.
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) brought out its Fourth Assessment Report, stressing the anthropogenic contribution to climate change and indicating firmly that the world could not afford climate change of more than 2 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial era. The renewed sense of urgency imparted by this report coupled with the natural progression of the Kyoto Protocol towards its demise, led to the adoption of the Bali Action Plan during COP 13 held in Bali in December 2007. The Action Plan set out a framework for negotiating a second phase of Kyoto, focusing on four main issues – mitigation; adaptation; technology development and transfer; and financial resources and investment. More importantly, countries agreed to reach an ‘agreed outcome’ – in all likelihood a legally binding treaty to be christened ‘Copenhagen Protocol’ to replace the Kyoto Protocol – by the end of 2009 at Copenhagen.
Although climate change negotiators have been working continuously at achieving this outcome, it has proved to be no mean task. Some symbolic progress was made at Poznan, Poland during COP 14 in 2008 when parties agreed to shift into full negotiating mode in 2009 and to draft a concrete negotiating text. Indeed, a negotiating text was available by the time of the Bonn meeting in June 2009. But there were many sticking points: By how much were the industrialized countries willing to reduce their emissions by 2020 (mid-term commitments)? What steps were the developing countries (in particular, the large emerging economies like India and China) willing to take to limit growth of their emissions? To what amount and mode of financing for adaptation and mitigation were the developed countries willing to commit? What commitments relating to technology development and transfer were achievable? Although a range of options was thrown up for discussion in relation to these questions, divergences remained both on broad principle as well as on specific detail.
At the Bangkok meeting in October 2009, the controversial ‘Australian proposal’ attracted substantial reaction as well as media attention. The proposal, backed by the EU and US, floats the idea of a single listing of all countries and similar commitments though of varying degrees and does not carry a contingent guarantee of technology or finance. Termed the “murder of the Kyoto Protocol” by India, the proposal was criticized for running counter to the very spirit of the Kyoto Protocol by putting the knife of ‘single listing’ through the heart of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. This principle is at the core of India’s negotiating position on climate change.
India has ratified the UNFCCC (1 November 1993) as well as the Kyoto Protocol (26 August 2002). Its prominence in the climate change negotiations increased after the US made its subscription to the Kyoto regime contingent upon binding emission reduction commitments by countries like India. India’s negotiating position in the climate regime has largely been defined by its response to this argument of the US. The central feature of India’s position has been an absolute refusal to be bound by legally binding emission reduction commitments for at least two reasons. As a first justification, India invokes the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ principle that is central to the architecture of the current climate regime. A second defense of its stand comes from a stress on convergence of ‘per capita emissions’ of developing and developed countries. With the US at roughly 19 and India at only 1.3 (US Department of Energy) in terms of per capita emissions, the Indian Prime Minister could assert confidently, as he did at the G8 Summit at Heiligendamm, Germany in 2007 that India’s per capita emission would never exceed that of the developed countries.
At Bangkok, India stressed that a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol along with deep cuts by the developed countries was non-negotiable. It further stressed that immediate and deep cuts in GHG emissions to be undertaken by the developed countries should be accompanied with specific mid-term targets. On its part, India proposed country-specific ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’ that could be supported with finance and technology and verified. However, it was made clear that India would not agree to any international review (measurement, reporting and verification) of its unilateral and unsupported domestic actions. Another issue argued by the developing countries is that of technology transfer and financing as a repayment of the carbon debt by the developed countries.
India has been proactively involved in the climate negotiations at various fora. At the Major Economies Forum (G8 + G5 + Australia + EU + Indonesia + South Korea), when India endorsed the “… scientific view that increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial levels ought not to exceed 2 degrees Celsius”, there was widespread media criticism as this was seen as an admission on an emissions cap. But according to Indian negotiators, this was only a ‘political statement of intent’ and not an ‘arithmetical binding target’. India has shown a keenness to be seen as a proactive participant of the climate regime, not an excessively defensive ‘deal-breaker’. As evidence of its increased commitment to the cause of climate change, it has accelerated domestic action viz. by finalizing the National Action Plan on Climate Change in June 2008, which envisages voluntary mitigation measures by 2020. The Plan includes eight national missions: solar; enhanced energy efficiency; sustainable habitat; water; sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem; ‘Green India’; sustainable agriculture and strategic knowledge for climate change.
The theme of India’s keenness to be accommodative was captured in a controversial letter by the Indian Minister for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, to the Prime Minister dated 13 October 2009, in which the minister seems to reverse India’s negotiating stance. As per the version made public by the media, the letter expresses concern about India being seen as a ‘deal-breaker’. It dilutes India’s stance demanding finance and technology as compensation from developed countries and underscores that “… we need to mitigate in self-interest”. It suggests that India allow scrutiny of even those emissions control steps that it takes under its own legislation and at its cost (like IMF surveillance and WTO TPRM). The letter also asserts that the Australian proposal will cause no harm to India as long as it recognizes differences in obligations. Needless to say, the Minister’s letter stirred up a hornet’s nest, although he later claimed that his communication had been totally distorted and the Prime Minister’s Office also clarified that there was to be no shift in the Indian negotiating stance. However, the letter did raise widespread concern over whether the Indian government was clear about what remains non-negotiable at Copenhagen.
Many differences remain to be sorted out at Copenhagen. As far as setting a threshold for maximum temperature rise is concerned, the 2 degree Celsius objective adopted at the MEF will probably constitute the agreed threshold, although in terms of carbon content, there are several figures in consideration. The issue of mitigation remains the farthest from agreement, with the developed countries refusing to put down hard numbers for mid-term reductions under the second phase of Kyoto and the developing countries refusing to be bound by emission reduction commitments. On adaptation, the contentious point relates to the amount of financing the rich countries are willing to commit to for the developing countries to adapt. In principle, there is agreement over the need for the developed countries to provide financing and technology, but wide divergences remain over amounts in figures. Also under consideration will be the issue of how the Kyoto mechanisms can be strengthened and expanded. There is also a move to make the developing countries upgrade their individual domestic commitments relating to climate change and make them part of international commitments. As the American Special Envoy on climate change, Todd Stern put it at the Major Economies Forum meet in London in October 2009, “What we need to have happen is for China and India and Brazil and South Africa and others to be willing to take what they’re doing in terms of emission cuts, boost it up some, and then be willing to put it into an international agreement”.
It is highly unlikely that countries like India will allow international monitoring of their domestic commitments, considering their clearly stated objection to binding commitments. Can the deadlock facing Copenhagen, especially in relation to mitigation commitments be broken, so that there is a chance for the negotiations to move forward? Some alternative views have been offered outside the formal negotiating fora, which merit attention. Noted economist, Jagdish Bhagwati, draws attention to the fact that while the ‘stock problem’ (80% of carbon accumulated in the atmosphere has come from the West) has been the point of reference in the climate negotiations, we cannot ignore the ‘flow problem’ (more than half the current carbon discharge into atmosphere is from the developing countries). He suggests that countries such as China and India should assume flow obligations although these would depend on the fulfillment of stock obligations by the developed countries. He also suggests that acceptance of current obligations would be contingent upon payment for past damages. Acceptance of flow obligations on the part of developing countries is impossible to imagine in the current state of negotiations but if it did come about at some point in time, it would represent a huge turning point in the climate change negotiations.
Another alternative to help break the deadlock by modifying the negotiating position of India is provided by Raghunandan, Purkayastha and Jayaraman, who suggest that India should announce non-binding but self-declared targets to restrict emissions to 25% below projected emissions by 2030 (rather than an absolute cut in emissions) conditional upon: (i) Annex I parties meeting binding targets of reducing emissions by 50% below 1990 levels by 2030 and 90% by 2050 (deep cuts through actual reductions not offset through trade measures); (ii) Annex I countries pay into a climate fund a sum equivalent to deficit in target achievement (iii) emission reduction technologies to be placed in public domain. This suggested solution also seeks to acknowledge current responsibility and to include action on the part of developing countries. But the inclusion of developing countries would be contingent on a continued stress on historical responsibility and meaningful action in that direction by the developed countries.
The role of the United States will be crucial is determining the future of the climate regimes. A recent poll showed that the American public is not convinced of the reality of the threat of global warming. US has resisted mandatory carbon emission limits previously and draft US legislation on climate change is still not ready for approval. Adoption of new US legislation will have direct implications for the adoption of a global agreement on climate change.
Regarding Copenhagen, the key question till recently was, “Will they ‘seal the deal’ at Copenhagen? Optimism on this front has waned steadily. The negotiating draft has been described as “long, confusing and contradictory” with a “…feast of alternative options” and “…a forest of square brackets”. The United Nations has officially lowered expectations for reaching a legally binding agreement at Copenhagen, with the UN Secretary General already planning “post-Copenhagen talks”, indicating that the talking will not be over in Copenhagen as was previously expected. Janos Pasztoe, the climate advisor to the UN Secretary General stated recently, “Climate Change is not going to be resolved in Copenhagen ….Copenhagen has to be a milestone”. So the most one can expect from Copenhagen is a non-binding political declaration. Although in the Barcelona meeting in the first week of November, the UNFCCC Executive Secretary spoke of the importance of achieving verifiable commitments at Copenhagen, he also referred to Copenhagen as the “turning point”, indicating thus that the negotiations would need to go on post Copenhagen.
The state of play of the climate change negotiations clearly indicates that Copenhagen will not achieve the results that were expected from it. The time has already run out to reach a detailed international agreement (i.e. to “seal the deal”). But according to some, that should not constitute a cause for worry. Jeffrey Sachs asserts that “… failure to reach an agreement need not be a cataclysm”. He points to the magnitude and complexity of the climate problem and asserts that a continued progress in taking small, practical steps would turn out to be much more meaningful than arriving hastily at a toothless agreement. According to Sachs, an “interim agreement on general principles” coupled with a “series of practical steps to tilt the trajectory on emissions” would be a good enough outcome of Copenhagen.
Climate change is but one manifestation of the deadlocked multilateralism that is evident in several other issue areas such as forests, trade, disarmament, etc. There are several reasons that make the climate negotiations more difficult than others. One reason can be drawn from the comment of Nobel Prize winning economist Elinor Olstrom, “…we do not have clear predictions for beating the tragedy of the commons at a global level”. Because the climate represents the ‘global commons’, and because taking action to control climate change, i.e. reducing GHG emissions, has different implications across countries, agreement on meaningful global action remains elusive. The commercial implications of action taken for climate control, i.e. the impact of emission reductions on development, is another aspect that comes in the way of agreement. The mismatch between the global nature of the problem of climate change and the state-centric negotiating strategies of states at the international level is a key factor in the lack of progress is the negotiations.
For now, it is certain that the ‘countdown’ must be reset to go beyond Copenhagen. There will be no legally binding agreement at Copenhagen and the focus of negotiation-watchers has to move to the road ahead of Copenhagen. Till the time that an internationally negotiated solution is agreed upon, it can only be hoped that action taken at the domestic level by individual states continues to add up to serve the cause of climate change control.
- November 2009
Climate Change Negotiations
Archna Negi
On the official website of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), a ticking clock marks time to the second accompanied with the words ‘Countdown to Copenhagen’. The ticking seconds convey a sense of urgency; viewed positively, they seem to suggest that as the clock stops ticking, the world will find its solution to the problem of climate change (at Copenhagen); viewed in a more pessimistic light, the clock conveys that we have only so much time left to find a solution to global warming (at Copenhagen) and that time is running out. Whatever it is that the clock is meant to convey, it is a foregone conclusion now that the clock will have to be reset.
At the 13th Conference of Parties (COP 13) of the UNFCCC held at Bali in 2007, consensus had been forged to reach an ‘agreed outcome’ by the 15th Conference of Parties (COP 15), scheduled to be held at Copenhagen, Denmark between the 7th and 18th of December this year. Representatives of over 170 governments will converge in the Danish city of Copenhagen, carrying on their shoulders the weight of the world’s expectations that they will come out with the magic solution to the single most pervasive problem of a planetary scale – climate change. They will be closely and keenly watched by thousands of representatives of the nongovernmental sector and the media present at the event, and through transmission and reporting, by the world at large. Copenhagen, after all, was the chosen birthplace of the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, the current legal device to address climate change, which will reach the end of its life in the year 2012.
It is worthwhile to recall briefly the journey till this point in time where the second phase of legal protections against climate change is being worked out. Recognition of the need for international cooperation and global action on the issue of climate change was first embodied in the UNFCCC, adopted at the mother of all summits – the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. The Framework Convention established for itself the twin goals of stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere to a safe level (mitigation) and coping with temperature rise (adaptation).
Although the gentle provisions of the mother convention (UNFCCC) proved to be widely acceptable and led to a near universal membership, which currently stands at 192, the notorious child (Kyoto Protocol) proved to be far more controversial. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 contained specific obligations to be undertaken by parties, including binding emission reduction targets that were imposed on some (Annex I) parties. Of the 184 parties to the Protocol, 37 industrialized states and the European Communities committed to reduce GHG emissions [by an average of 5% against 1990 levels over the 5-year period (2008-2012)]. The defining feature of the Kyoto Protocol (also what makes it most controversial) is that it is based on the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, i.e. it recognizes that the developed countries are principally responsible for current GHG stock in the atmosphere (emitted in 150-200 years of industrial activity) and therefore places a higher burden on them. While industrial countries are to meet their reduction targets first and foremost by taking domestic action, the Protocol allows the meeting of emission reduction commitments abroad through market based ‘Kyoto mechanisms’.
The Kyoto mechanisms – Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism – allow for flexibility in meeting emission reduction commitments if they cannot be met purely by domestic action. As part of the ‘carbon market’ set up under the Emissions Trading mechanism (Article 17), parties with emission reduction commitments are assigned targets for the 2008-2012 commitment period and if countries have spare emission units, they can sell their excess units to other committed countries that are likely to cross their target. A country with emission reduction targets may earn emission reduction units by implementing emission-reduction projects in other countries – it can do so in another Annex I country [Joint Implementation (Article 6)] or in a developing country [Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12)].
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol was not smooth because the emission reductions that it mandated were viewed as a curtailment of development activities. The biggest carbon emitter remained notably absent from the Kyoto regime, refusing to be bound by the commitments imposed by the Protocol. The US administration made it clear that it would not be signatory to any protocol that (i) did not include binding targets and timetables for developing countries as well or (ii) that would result in ‘serious harm’ to the American economy. Despite the non-participation of the largest emitter, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005 when Russia ratified it, fulfilling the legal requirements for entry into force. While Australia – the other major long-time non-member – came on board in December 2007 (ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was the first official act of the new Kevin Rudd government), the US continues to remain outside the sphere of operation of the Protocol.
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) brought out its Fourth Assessment Report, stressing the anthropogenic contribution to climate change and indicating firmly that the world could not afford climate change of more than 2 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial era. The renewed sense of urgency imparted by this report coupled with the natural progression of the Kyoto Protocol towards its demise, led to the adoption of the Bali Action Plan during COP 13 held in Bali in December 2007. The Action Plan set out a framework for negotiating a second phase of Kyoto, focusing on four main issues – mitigation; adaptation; technology development and transfer; and financial resources and investment. More importantly, countries agreed to reach an ‘agreed outcome’ – in all likelihood a legally binding treaty to be christened ‘Copenhagen Protocol’ to replace the Kyoto Protocol – by the end of 2009 at Copenhagen.
Although climate change negotiators have been working continuously at achieving this outcome, it has proved to be no mean task. Some symbolic progress was made at Poznan, Poland during COP 14 in 2008 when parties agreed to shift into full negotiating mode in 2009 and to draft a concrete negotiating text. Indeed, a negotiating text was available by the time of the Bonn meeting in June 2009. But there were many sticking points: By how much were the industrialized countries willing to reduce their emissions by 2020 (mid-term commitments)? What steps were the developing countries (in particular, the large emerging economies like India and China) willing to take to limit growth of their emissions? To what amount and mode of financing for adaptation and mitigation were the developed countries willing to commit? What commitments relating to technology development and transfer were achievable? Although a range of options was thrown up for discussion in relation to these questions, divergences remained both on broad principle as well as on specific detail.
At the Bangkok meeting in October 2009, the controversial ‘Australian proposal’ attracted substantial reaction as well as media attention. The proposal, backed by the EU and US, floats the idea of a single listing of all countries and similar commitments though of varying degrees and does not carry a contingent guarantee of technology or finance. Termed the “murder of the Kyoto Protocol” by India, the proposal was criticized for running counter to the very spirit of the Kyoto Protocol by putting the knife of ‘single listing’ through the heart of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. This principle is at the core of India’s negotiating position on climate change.
India has ratified the UNFCCC (1 November 1993) as well as the Kyoto Protocol (26 August 2002). Its prominence in the climate change negotiations increased after the US made its subscription to the Kyoto regime contingent upon binding emission reduction commitments by countries like India. India’s negotiating position in the climate regime has largely been defined by its response to this argument of the US. The central feature of India’s position has been an absolute refusal to be bound by legally binding emission reduction commitments for at least two reasons. As a first justification, India invokes the ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ principle that is central to the architecture of the current climate regime. A second defense of its stand comes from a stress on convergence of ‘per capita emissions’ of developing and developed countries. With the US at roughly 19 and India at only 1.3 (US Department of Energy) in terms of per capita emissions, the Indian Prime Minister could assert confidently, as he did at the G8 Summit at Heiligendamm, Germany in 2007 that India’s per capita emission would never exceed that of the developed countries.
At Bangkok, India stressed that a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol along with deep cuts by the developed countries was non-negotiable. It further stressed that immediate and deep cuts in GHG emissions to be undertaken by the developed countries should be accompanied with specific mid-term targets. On its part, India proposed country-specific ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’ that could be supported with finance and technology and verified. However, it was made clear that India would not agree to any international review (measurement, reporting and verification) of its unilateral and unsupported domestic actions. Another issue argued by the developing countries is that of technology transfer and financing as a repayment of the carbon debt by the developed countries.
India has been proactively involved in the climate negotiations at various fora. At the Major Economies Forum (G8 + G5 + Australia + EU + Indonesia + South Korea), when India endorsed the “… scientific view that increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial levels ought not to exceed 2 degrees Celsius”, there was widespread media criticism as this was seen as an admission on an emissions cap. But according to Indian negotiators, this was only a ‘political statement of intent’ and not an ‘arithmetical binding target’. India has shown a keenness to be seen as a proactive participant of the climate regime, not an excessively defensive ‘deal-breaker’. As evidence of its increased commitment to the cause of climate change, it has accelerated domestic action viz. by finalizing the National Action Plan on Climate Change in June 2008, which envisages voluntary mitigation measures by 2020. The Plan includes eight national missions: solar; enhanced energy efficiency; sustainable habitat; water; sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem; ‘Green India’; sustainable agriculture and strategic knowledge for climate change.
The theme of India’s keenness to be accommodative was captured in a controversial letter by the Indian Minister for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, to the Prime Minister dated 13 October 2009, in which the minister seems to reverse India’s negotiating stance. As per the version made public by the media, the letter expresses concern about India being seen as a ‘deal-breaker’. It dilutes India’s stance demanding finance and technology as compensation from developed countries and underscores that “… we need to mitigate in self-interest”. It suggests that India allow scrutiny of even those emissions control steps that it takes under its own legislation and at its cost (like IMF surveillance and WTO TPRM). The letter also asserts that the Australian proposal will cause no harm to India as long as it recognizes differences in obligations. Needless to say, the Minister’s letter stirred up a hornet’s nest, although he later claimed that his communication had been totally distorted and the Prime Minister’s Office also clarified that there was to be no shift in the Indian negotiating stance. However, the letter did raise widespread concern over whether the Indian government was clear about what remains non-negotiable at Copenhagen.
Many differences remain to be sorted out at Copenhagen. As far as setting a threshold for maximum temperature rise is concerned, the 2 degree Celsius objective adopted at the MEF will probably constitute the agreed threshold, although in terms of carbon content, there are several figures in consideration. The issue of mitigation remains the farthest from agreement, with the developed countries refusing to put down hard numbers for mid-term reductions under the second phase of Kyoto and the developing countries refusing to be bound by emission reduction commitments. On adaptation, the contentious point relates to the amount of financing the rich countries are willing to commit to for the developing countries to adapt. In principle, there is agreement over the need for the developed countries to provide financing and technology, but wide divergences remain over amounts in figures. Also under consideration will be the issue of how the Kyoto mechanisms can be strengthened and expanded. There is also a move to make the developing countries upgrade their individual domestic commitments relating to climate change and make them part of international commitments. As the American Special Envoy on climate change, Todd Stern put it at the Major Economies Forum meet in London in October 2009, “What we need to have happen is for China and India and Brazil and South Africa and others to be willing to take what they’re doing in terms of emission cuts, boost it up some, and then be willing to put it into an international agreement”.
It is highly unlikely that countries like India will allow international monitoring of their domestic commitments, considering their clearly stated objection to binding commitments. Can the deadlock facing Copenhagen, especially in relation to mitigation commitments be broken, so that there is a chance for the negotiations to move forward? Some alternative views have been offered outside the formal negotiating fora, which merit attention. Noted economist, Jagdish Bhagwati, draws attention to the fact that while the ‘stock problem’ (80% of carbon accumulated in the atmosphere has come from the West) has been the point of reference in the climate negotiations, we cannot ignore the ‘flow problem’ (more than half the current carbon discharge into atmosphere is from the developing countries). He suggests that countries such as China and India should assume flow obligations although these would depend on the fulfillment of stock obligations by the developed countries. He also suggests that acceptance of current obligations would be contingent upon payment for past damages. Acceptance of flow obligations on the part of developing countries is impossible to imagine in the current state of negotiations but if it did come about at some point in time, it would represent a huge turning point in the climate change negotiations.
Another alternative to help break the deadlock by modifying the negotiating position of India is provided by Raghunandan, Purkayastha and Jayaraman, who suggest that India should announce non-binding but self-declared targets to restrict emissions to 25% below projected emissions by 2030 (rather than an absolute cut in emissions) conditional upon: (i) Annex I parties meeting binding targets of reducing emissions by 50% below 1990 levels by 2030 and 90% by 2050 (deep cuts through actual reductions not offset through trade measures); (ii) Annex I countries pay into a climate fund a sum equivalent to deficit in target achievement (iii) emission reduction technologies to be placed in public domain. This suggested solution also seeks to acknowledge current responsibility and to include action on the part of developing countries. But the inclusion of developing countries would be contingent on a continued stress on historical responsibility and meaningful action in that direction by the developed countries.
The role of the United States will be crucial is determining the future of the climate regimes. A recent poll showed that the American public is not convinced of the reality of the threat of global warming. US has resisted mandatory carbon emission limits previously and draft US legislation on climate change is still not ready for approval. Adoption of new US legislation will have direct implications for the adoption of a global agreement on climate change.
Regarding Copenhagen, the key question till recently was, “Will they ‘seal the deal’ at Copenhagen? Optimism on this front has waned steadily. The negotiating draft has been described as “long, confusing and contradictory” with a “…feast of alternative options” and “…a forest of square brackets”. The United Nations has officially lowered expectations for reaching a legally binding agreement at Copenhagen, with the UN Secretary General already planning “post-Copenhagen talks”, indicating that the talking will not be over in Copenhagen as was previously expected. Janos Pasztoe, the climate advisor to the UN Secretary General stated recently, “Climate Change is not going to be resolved in Copenhagen ….Copenhagen has to be a milestone”. So the most one can expect from Copenhagen is a non-binding political declaration. Although in the Barcelona meeting in the first week of November, the UNFCCC Executive Secretary spoke of the importance of achieving verifiable commitments at Copenhagen, he also referred to Copenhagen as the “turning point”, indicating thus that the negotiations would need to go on post Copenhagen.
The state of play of the climate change negotiations clearly indicates that Copenhagen will not achieve the results that were expected from it. The time has already run out to reach a detailed international agreement (i.e. to “seal the deal”). But according to some, that should not constitute a cause for worry. Jeffrey Sachs asserts that “… failure to reach an agreement need not be a cataclysm”. He points to the magnitude and complexity of the climate problem and asserts that a continued progress in taking small, practical steps would turn out to be much more meaningful than arriving hastily at a toothless agreement. According to Sachs, an “interim agreement on general principles” coupled with a “series of practical steps to tilt the trajectory on emissions” would be a good enough outcome of Copenhagen.
Climate change is but one manifestation of the deadlocked multilateralism that is evident in several other issue areas such as forests, trade, disarmament, etc. There are several reasons that make the climate negotiations more difficult than others. One reason can be drawn from the comment of Nobel Prize winning economist Elinor Olstrom, “…we do not have clear predictions for beating the tragedy of the commons at a global level”. Because the climate represents the ‘global commons’, and because taking action to control climate change, i.e. reducing GHG emissions, has different implications across countries, agreement on meaningful global action remains elusive. The commercial implications of action taken for climate control, i.e. the impact of emission reductions on development, is another aspect that comes in the way of agreement. The mismatch between the global nature of the problem of climate change and the state-centric negotiating strategies of states at the international level is a key factor in the lack of progress is the negotiations.
For now, it is certain that the ‘countdown’ must be reset to go beyond Copenhagen. There will be no legally binding agreement at Copenhagen and the focus of negotiation-watchers has to move to the road ahead of Copenhagen. Till the time that an internationally negotiated solution is agreed upon, it can only be hoped that action taken at the domestic level by individual states continues to add up to serve the cause of climate change control.
- November 2009
No comments:
Post a Comment