Updated with seminar report: Amandeep Gill to talk about India's arms control policy

Amandeep Gill of the Disarmament and International Security Affairs (DISA) division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) will speak at the CIPOD Wednesday seminar on 'India and the New Arms Control Agenda' on August 19, 2009.

Keep reading for a report on his presentation . . .

Gill is Director at DISA. He has extensive experience in arms control and disarmament issues, having dealt with it for almost ten years of his service in the MEA. He was also a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University. He wrote recently in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that India was unlikely to sign the CTBT even if the US Senate ratifies the treaty.

Updated 24/08/09: Here's a brief summary of Gill's presentation:

Amandeep Gill presented his view of India’s position on the new arms control agenda at the CIPOD Wednesday seminar on August 19. He was speaking in his personal capacity.

He stated that India’s arms control positions were organic and alive, based both on principles and pragmatism. These positions have an inherent link with national security, as it became clear during the CTBT debate. India will support global, verifiable and non-discriminatory disarmament measures but the Indian Government has a responsibility to its citizens with regard to their security in a nuclearised world. Apart from this link with national security, the debate in India regarding our arms control positions was also now more open. He felt that there was a broad consensus that the correct way to approach the process of disarmament is through delegitimizing nuclear weapons through measures such as de-alerting.

There is also a global context: nuclear postures are changing the world over. Both the US and China are enhancing their nuclear triad, with new delivery capabilities as well as missile defence and asymmetric capabilities. India is also developing a triad capability but on a much more modest scale. There are a number of causes for concern in these global developments including the possibility of a nuclearised Korean peninsula and concern over Iran’s nuclear technology development. Regarding the non-proliferation regime, Gill said that the Bush administration, though unilateralist, showed pragmatism in going beyond the existing regimes. While current problems dictate a need to modify and go beyond existing regimes, there is resistance to this.

Regarding India’s position on specific issues, Gill reiterated the Indian position that the NPT was a flawed treaty, flaws which were reinforced in 1995 when the treaty was extended indefinitely. But it was unrealistic for India to expect that the treaty would be modified to let India in as a nuclear weapon state, just as it was unrealistic to expect that India will join the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. While the NPT itself can stay, we also need to go beyond it to prevent proliferation. On CTBT and testing, Indian restraint has been unparalleled, but the CTBT needs to be a logical and necessary step on the path towards nuclear disarmament. In India many still see it as part of the old non-proliferation regime which discriminated against India. Ultimately, it is a matter of perception: if others see India as a partner rather than as a target, Indian views of the CTBT will also change.

On the FMCT, India can engage confidently with the rest of the world. Its position on fundamentals has not changed since 1993: it wants a multilateral, non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty that meets its national security concerns. On Iran, he said that Iran has made commitments that it needs to live up to and the appropriate body to deal with the issue is the IAEA.